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If n his opening remarks to the Symposium which was the occasion for the 
llcurrent consideration of the international-law constraints on computer net-
work attack (CNA) , 1 Vice AdmiralA. K. Cebrowski, President of the US Naval 
War College, asked the conferees, inter alia, to pay attention to the question, 
"Does international law require us to wait until lives are lost or property dam-
aged before we may engage in acts of self-defense?2 This is a question that has 
troubled international decision-makers and legal scholars for centuries. It has 
given rise to numerous and diverse opinions as to the proper threshold for the 
moment at which a potential victim State may lawfully use armed force to pro-
tect itselfbefore the national border has been crossed, or the bombs have begun 
to fall, or the missiles have been launched. Consideration of this subject has 
given rise to a number of theories denominated by scholars and others variously 
as "pre-emptive" strike, "anticipatory self-defense," "interceptive self-defense," 
and a variety of other terms. Determining the moment when a State may legally 
take armed defensive action as a matter of self-preservation is difficult enough in 
the arena of conventional armed attack, where military and political intent may 
be divined from concrete actions of the alleged aggressor State, such as mobiliza-
tion of military and economic forces, movement of ground troops and/or air 
and naval forces, and military exercises which may be regarded as rehearsals for 
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armed action. But when an attack-i.e., computer network attack-can be ini-
tiated without warning and instantaneously by a few computer strokes or clicks 
of a mouse at a location remote from the target State,3 determining the threshold 
criteria is even more difficult. Nevertheless, the harm to a target nation and its 
infrastructure can be equally or more devastating than if kinetic forces were 
used. The destruction or impairment of critical networks controlling such activ-
ities as domestic air control systems, electrical power systems and grids, national 
banking systems, etc., even if military command and control networks are unaf-
fected, could cripple a nation's economy and create a public health crisis ofim-
mense proportions. 
While a leading expert in the field of network security who addressed the 
symposium assured the participants that a successful penetration of secure sys-
tems was not as easy as some alarmists have made it out to be,4 it is nevertheless 
generally accepted that a skilled and persistent "hacker" could penetrate and se-
riously damage many critical infrastructures. Assuming even that such an im-
pending attack could be predicted with reasonable certainty, an issue which will 
be discussed at a later point in this chapter, the fact that the attack could be con-
ducted by an individual or group that mayor may not be a part of the armed 
forces or otherwise officially connected to a State, raises the additional questions 
of whether such an attack can be attributed to the State in which the attack is ini-
tiated and whether such an attack is an "armed attack" within the accepted 
meaning of that term. Or is it, in the nomenclature used by Professor Y oram 
Dinstein, only an "unfriendly act" or an "ordinary breach of international law, "5 
which, under the widely accepted view, does not come within the prohibition 
of a "threat or use offorce" as that term is used in Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter?6 Categorization is particularly important in view of Article 51's 
mandate that authorizes resort to the "inherent" right of self-defense only "if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member ofihe United Nations."7 
The principal paper on the subject of self-defense at the CNA Symposium 
was given by Professor Dinstein and is published in this commentary under the 
title, "Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense."8 As the moderator of a 
small group of symposium participants designated to discuss this subject follow-
ing the presentation of the paper, I was asked to prepare additional comments on 
the subject. Rather than address all aspects of the doctrine of self-defense against 
computer network attack that were dealt with in Professor Dinstein's paper and 
in the small group discussion, I shall primarily focus in this commentary on the 
discussion which dealt with the issue raised by Admiral Cebrowski in his open-
ing remarks-whether international law requires a State to wait until lives are 
lost or property damaged before it responds in self-defense. Professor Dinstein 
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answers this question in the negative by invoking a doctrine which he labels as 
"interceptive self-defense."9 This subject provoked the most lively discussion in 
the small group and revealed substantial differences of opinion among the con-
ferees. In essence, they appeared to be expressions of two schools of thought that 
find support in the legal literature on this subject. The first of these supports the 
"strict" interpretation of UN Charter Article 51, which would require that an 
armed attack have actually taken place before a victim State may respond in 
self-defense. Professor Dinstein's "interceptive self-defense" is a sub-set of this 
school, giving it some flexibility ofinterpretation by allowing counter-action to 
be taken in advance of the first blow being struck by an analysis of when the 
armed attack actually begins, that is, when the potential aggressor "embarks 
upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon. "10 The sec-
ond school asserts that there exists an "inherent" right of self-defense pre-dating 
the Charter, which continues to exist alongside the law of the Charter, and per-
mits, in some cases, "anticipatory" self-defense when an armed attack may not 
have actually occurred but, according to objective evidence, is imminent. ' 
The IIStrict'1 School 
The intellectual foundation for a "strict" interpretation of Article 51 can be 
found either in a narrow or literal reading of Article 51 as suggested by a 
number of eminent authorities or in the interpretation elaborated by Professor 
Dinstein in his book, War, Aggression and Self-Deftnce, that there was no 
pre-existing law of self-defense prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, and 
thus the law of self-defense as expressed in Article 51 is the sole legal basis for 
exercising this right. 
One of the earlier expressions of the narrow or literal reading of Article 51 is 
found in an article by ProfessorJosefKunz, who stated in 1947 that: 
[T]his right [of self-defense under Article 51] does not exist against any form of 
aggression which does not constitute "armed attack." ... [T]his term means 
something that has taken place. Art. 51 prohibits "preventive war." The "threat 
of aggression" does not justify self-defense under Art. 51 .... The "imminent" 
armed attack does not suffice under Art. 51.11 
Dr. Djura Nincic makes a similar argument, stating: 
[N]othing less than an armed attack shall constitute an act-condition for the exercise 
of the right of self-defense within the meaning of Article 51 .... It further 
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stipulates that the armed attack must precede the exercise of the right of se!f-deJellse, that 
only an anned attack which has actually materialized, which has "occurred" shall 
warrant a resort to self-defense. This clearly and e}.1'licitly rules out the 
pennissibility of any "anticipatory" exercise of the right of self-defense, i.e., resort 
to anned force "in anticipation" of an anned attack.12 
Other adherents of this view include Hans Kelsen,13 Louis Henkin,14 Ian 
Brownlie,15 Hersch Lauterpacht,16 Andrew Martin,17 and Robert Tucker.1s 
Professor Randelzhofer, who authored the Chapters on Articles 2(4) and 51 in 
Simma's exhaustive exegesis on the UN Charter,19 also adopts, as the "prevail-
ing view," the strict interpretation ascribed to the aforementioned scholars.2o 
With respect to the specific question of whether a State has a right of anticipatory 
self-defense, he acknowledges that "[t]here is no consensus in international legal 
doctrine over the point. "21 But he goes on to conclude that" Art. 51 has to be in-
terpreted narrowly as containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-defence. 
Self-defence is thus permissible only cifter the armed attack has already beell 
launched. "22 His rationale for this conclusion is that since 
the (alleged) imminence of an attack cannot usually be assessed by means of 
objective criteria, any decision on this point would necessarily have to be left to 
the discretion of the state concerned. The manifest risk of an abuse of that 
discretion which thus emerges would de facto undennine the restriction to one 
particular case of the right of self-defence. 23 
Professor Dinstein also adheres to the view that a literal interpretation of Arti-
cle 51 is required, arguing, in essence, that a right of self-defense exists if, and 
only if, an armed attack occurs.24 He reaches that conclusion by a different route, 
however. In War, Aggression and Self-Difence, he argues, in effect, that there was 
no legally-recognized right of national self-defense prior to the adoption of the 
UN Charter. In support of that view he states: 
From the dawn ofintemationallaw, writers sought to apply this [domestic law] 
concept [of self-defense] to inter-State relations, particularly in connection with 
the just war doctrine .... But when the freedom to wage war was countenanced 
without reservation (in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), concern 
with the issue of self-defence was largely a meta juridical exercise. As long as 
recourse to war was considered free for all, against all, for any reason on 
earth-including territorial e}.1'ansion or even motives of prestige and 
grandeur-States did not need a legal justification to commence hostilities. The 
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plea of self-defence was relevant to the legality of forcible measures short of war, 
such as extra-territorial law enforcement .... Still, logically as well as legally, it 
had no role to play in the international arena as regards the cardinal issue of war. 
Up to the point of the prohibition of war [i.e., adoption of the UN Charter], to 
most intents and purposes, "self-defence was not a legal concept but merely a 
political excuse for the use of force. "25 
Further developing this theme, Professor Dinstein argues that the right of 
self-defense cannot be justified under either natural law or as an element of the 
sovereignty of States. With respect to the natural law he states: 
[A] reference to self-defence as a "natural right", or a right generated by "natural 
law", is unwarranted. It may be conceived as an anachronistic residue from an era 
in which international law was dominated by ecclesiastical doctrines.26 
With respect to reliance on the principle of sovereignty as a basis for an 
"inherent" right of self-defense, he acknowledges that the series of identical 
American notes accompanying the invitations to a number of States to be-
come parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact lends some support to that theory. 
Those notes stated, inter alia, that the right of self-defense "is inherent in every 
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty."27 Professor Dinstein states, 
however, that: 
[T]he principle of State sovereignty sheds no light on the theme of self-defence. 
State sovereignty has a variable content, which depends on the stage of 
development of the international legal order at any given moment. The best 
index of the altered perception of sovereignty is that, in the nineteenth (and early 
twentieth) century, the liberty of every State to go to war as and when it pleased 
was also considered "a right inherent in sovereignty itself' .... Notwithstanding 
the abolition of this liberty in the last half-century, the sovereignty of States did 
not crumble. The contemporary right to employ inter-State force in self-defence 
is no more "inherent" in sovereignty than the discredited right to resort to force at 
all times.28 
While it is clear from Professor Dinstein's analysis that he regards a State's 
right of self-defense not to be activated until an armed attack actually occurs, 
he avoids the catastrophic consequences that might result from such a rigid doc-
trine by walking back the time that an attack actually begins to the point where 
the incipient attacker "embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby 
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crossing the Rubicon. "29 He labels this as "interceptive" self-defense, which he 
distinguishes from "anticipatory" self-defense in that it requires that the other 
side "has committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way," 
rather than that the attack is merely "foreseeable."3o 
While it is true that the self-defense doctrine owes its origin to theological and 
natural-law sources, which were the foundations of the concept of the '~ust 
war,"31 and while Professor Dinstein is undoubtedly correct that during the 
positivist era of the 19th and early 20th centuries, any State was free to make war 
as an element of sovereignty, States nonetheless often continued to plead 
self-defense as a legal as well as a political or moral justification. This practice was 
more than a vestigial remnant of ecclesiastical law. States regarded it as inherent 
in their statehood; it is therefore not surprising that the term "inherent" found its 
way into Article 51 of the Charter. 
Although Professor Randelzhofer states that the literal or strict interpretation 
of Article 51 with its denunciation of anticipatory self-defense is the "prevailing 
view" among recognized scholars, he nevertheless admits that there is substantial 
scholarly opinion contra. He states: 
There is no consensus in international legal doctrine over the point in time from 
which measures of self-defence against an armed attack may be taken. Thus, in 
particular those authors who interpret Art. 51 as merely confirming the 
pre-existing right of self-defence consider anticipatory measures of self-defence 
to be admissible under the conditions set up by Webster in the Carolille case, i.e. 
when "the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."32 
The adherents of this opposing view are both numerous and distinguished. They 
include, among others, such publicists as Oscar Schachter, Myres McDougal, 
RobertJennings, Humphrey Waldock, and Antonio Cassese. 
Sir Humphrey Waldock was one of the earliest critics of the highly restrictive 
interpretation of Article 51 by the literalists. In his Hague lectures of 1952, Sir 
Humphrey stated: 
If an armed attack is imminent \vithin the strict doctrine of the Caroline, then it 
would seem to bring the case within Article 51. To read Article 51 othenvise is 
to protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke. To cut down the customary 
right of self-defense beyond even the Carolille doctrine does not make sense in 
times when the speed and power of weapons of attack has enormously 
increased.33 
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Professor Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, focusing primarily on the 
Kunz and Nincic readings of the Charter text, argue that the objections to such 
readings are twofold. First, Kunz and Nincic attempt to interpret the meaning of the 
tex1: from an analysis of the words alone, attempting to divine a single clear and un-
ambiguous meaning, and Kunz, in addition," casually de-emphasize[s]" the prepara-
tory work on the document. The second major flaw in their argument is that they 
seriously underestimate the potentialities of modem military weapons systems and 
the contemporary techniques of non-military coercion.34 
With respect to arguments that allowing a State to respond in an anticipatory 
manner would vest too much discretion in individual States, McDougal and 
Feliciano point out that the claim to the right of self-defense "remains subject to 
the reviewing authority of the organized community."35 
One of the more cogent criticisms of the conclusions reached by the literalists 
was made by Professor David Linnan in a recent article in which he applied the 
interpretive principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to an 
interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. He states: 
Under the Vienna Convention, the te}..wal exegesis or ordinary meaning approach 
enjoys primacy in the absence of inherent ambiguity or manifesdy absurd result. 
Publicists employing the ordinary meaning approach, but dismissing Article 51's 
inherent right-droit lIatllrel language as mere infelicitous drafting (viewing the 
natural law approach as generally discredited) violate its most basic 
canon. . . . [U]nder an ordinary meaning approach the use of the natural law 
terminology indicates the adoption by reference of its scheme of self-defense 
(,vithout reaching or e}..'Pressing an opinion on the validity of the natural law 
approach itself, which is a national view of international law not shared by all 
states). Regarding the scheme of self-defense adopted, U.S. views expressed in the 
notes accompanying the Kellogg-Briand Pact are representative.36 
Professor Linnan goes on to argue that if, however, the use of the term "in-
herent right" creates an ambiguity, it brings into play the secondary rule ofinter-
pretation, which authorizes resort to supplementary materials under Article 32 
of the Vienna Convention, at which point the "legislative history" of Article 51 
comes to the fore. As he and many other publicists have pointed out,37 the draft-
ing history shows clearly that Article 51 was inserted to clarify the point that the 
new Security Council system would not displace contemporaneous efforts in-
volving the creation of regional security systems.38 
But international law is not just a creature of treaty text. It is at least equally a 
product of State practice. Analyzing State practice since the adoption of the 
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Charter, Sir RobertJennings and Sir Arthur Watts, while cautioning that antici-
patory self-defense should be regarded as unlawful under most circumstances, 
state that: 
[I]t is not necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on the 
facts of the situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the 
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of 
avoiding that serious threat.39 
Proceeding on that basis, they conclude: 
The development of the law, particularly in the light of more recent state 
practice, in the 150 years since the Caroline incident, suggests that action, even if 
it involves the use of armed force and the violation of another state's territory, 
can be justified as self-defence under international law where (a) an armed attack 
is launched or is immediately threatened, against a state's territory or forces (and 
probably its nationals); (b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive action 
against that attack; (c) there is no practicable alternative to action in 
self-defence ... ; (d) the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is 
necessary to stop or prevent the infringement, i.e., to the needs of defence; and 
(e) in the case of collective self-defence, the victim of an armed attack has 
requested assistance.40 
The severe restraints that Jennings and Watts would apply to the exercise of 
"anticipatory" self-defense reflect their concern that the right could be abused 
with enormously serious consequences. Professor Rosalyn Higgins has ex-
pressed the same concern. She has contrasted two cases in which Israel asserted 
this doctrine to justify resort to pre-emptive strikes to illustrate her view of 
what mayor may not constitute a justified anticipatory exercise of the right of 
self-defense. The first was the Six Days War of 1967. Recall the events leading 
up to Israel's pre-emptory attack: President Nasser summarily ejected the UN 
Emergency Force from Sinai and the Gaza strip; he closed the Straits ofTiran, 
a vital seaway link for Israel to the outside world; both Syria and Egypt massed 
troops on Israel's border; and Syria and Egypt unleashed a barrage of bellicose 
statements. As Professor Higgins points out, neither the UN Security Council 
nor the UN General Assembly condemned Israel's action. On the contrary, 
there was a general feeling, "certainly shared by the Western states, that taken 
in context, this was a lawful use of anticipatory self-defence."'!! The second 
case was that of the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. 
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There, the Security Council, with the concurrence of the United States and 
the Common Market's "Group of Ten," "strongly condemn[ed}" Israel's ac-
tions.42 Not only was the building of a nuclear reactor not a use of force; the 
timing of the strike lacked the temporal element of urgency required by the 
Caroline criteria.43 
Professor Cassese, in the same collection of essays, agrees with Professor Hig-
gins and, in addition, appears to go further by relaxing somewhat the rigorous 
criteria of the Caroline case. 
One might perhaps draw the conclusion that consensus is now emerging that 
under Art. 51 anticipatory self-defence is allowed, but on the strict conditions that 
(i) solid and consistent evidence exists that another country is about to engage on a 
large-scale armed attack jeopardizing the very life of the target State and (ii) no 
peaceful means of preventing such attack are available either because they would 
certainly prove useless to the specific circumstances, or for lack of time to resort to 
them, or because they have been exhausted.44 
One of the most vocal critics of the strict interpretation theory has been the 
late Professor McDougal. He urged that in the age of the ballistic missile, to post-
pone action in self-defense until after the "last irrevocable act" reduces the right 
of self-defense to a right of retaliatory response. 
It is precisely this probable effect that gives to the narrowly restnctlve 
construction of Article 51, when appraised for future application, a strong air of 
romanticism.45 
Professor Schachter has written on the subject of self-defense on several occa-
sions. While his writings reflect a profound commitment to the principles of Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the UN Charter, he nevertheless concludes that Article 51 cannot be 
so narrowly construed as to require a State to forego the right to respond when, 
based on persuasive evidence, an attack appears imminent. As he stated most elo-
quently in 1986: 
On the level of principle, it makes sense to support a norm that opposes the 
preemptive resort to force but acknowledges its necessity when an attack is so 
immediate and massive as to make it absurd to demand that the target state await 
the actual attack before taking defensive action. Webster's statement in the 
Caroline case is probably the only acceptable formulation at the present time to 
meet this situation.46 
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Finally, one must consider the judgment of the International Court of Jus-
tice in the Nicaragua case, as well as Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion. In the 
jurisdictional phase of the case, the United States had argued that its multilat-
eral treaty reservation divested the court of jurisdiction since the customary 
law of self-defense had been "subsumed" or "supervened" by treaty law, that 
is, Article 51 of the Charter. At that stage, the Court, in refusing to dismiss the 
case, stated: 
The fact that the above-mentioned principles [including inter alia the principle of 
self-defense] ... have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does 
not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even 
as regards countries that are parties to such conventions.47 
During the Merits stage, the Court further concluded that even if the customary 
law and treaty principles were identical in content, the customary-law rule may 
apply separately and independently.48 Since, however, the parties to the case 
placed their reliance as to the applicability of the right of self-defense only on the 
case of an armed attack which had already occurred, the issue of the lawfulness of 
an armed response to an imminent threat of attack was not raised nor addressed 
by the majority opinion.49 
Judge Schwebel, in his dissent, while also acknowledging that the issue was 
not before the Court, and while recognizing that "the issue is controversial and 
open to more than one substantial view," opined, ex abundi cautela, that he dis-
agreed with a construction of Article 51 as if it read, "Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if, 
and only if, an armed attack occurs."so 
While the foregoing discussion admittedly constitutes only a partial review 
of the many scholarly writings on the use of force and the right of self-defense, 
I believe it constitutes a fair representation of the various positions taken by the 
leading commentators who have addressed this issue. From this review it 
would appear safe to conclude that there is a deep division between those who 
argue for a literal interpretation of Article 51 and those who argue that such an 
interpretation is inconsistent with the true meaning of the Article, particularly 
in the post-nuclear age. To conclude that one view or the other is the "pre-
vailing" view, as Randelzhofer has done, is, I believe, too strong a conclusion 
to draw given the number and eminence of the scholars that are represented in 
the opposing camp. 
In view of the foregoing, I do not consider it to be unreasonable that the 
United States takes the position that anticipatory self-defense against an 
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imminent attack is pennitted under Article 51. This position is articulated in the 
relevant military operational manuals and in the Joint ChiefS of Staff OCS) 
Standing Rules of Engagement. The Navy's Manual, for example, provides as 
follows: 
Anticipatory Self-Defense. Included within the inherent right of self-defense is 
the right of a nation (and its anned forces) to protect itself from imminent attack. 
International law recognizes that it would be contrary to the purposes of the 
United Nations Charter if a threatened nation were required to absorb an 
aggressor's initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking those military 
measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory self-difellSe involves 
the lise of anlled force where attack is imminellt and no reasonable choice of peaciflll means is 
available. 51 
The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement authorize the exercise of the right 
of anticipatory self-defense against forces displaying "hostile intent," which is 
defined, inter alia, as follows: 
Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, 
US forces, and in some circumstances, US nationals, their property, US 
commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and 
their property.52 -
Having concluded that it would not be unreasonable for a State to take the 
position that anticipatory self-defense against an imminent armed attack is law-
ful, and having found that the United States has adopted this position, the ques-
tion remains as to what are the criteria for detennining when an attack is 
"imminent." The classic formulation is US Secretary of State Daniel Webster's 
dictum that an armed response is lawful when the necessity of action is "instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion. "53 This is the test adopted by many eminent scholars and has been repeated 
often in legal and diplomatic arguments. It was adopted in the US Navy's opera-
tional manual prior to its current iteration. 54 A number of scholars have con-
cluded, however, that this articulation is much too restrictive in the present age, 
particularly in the light of the possibility of devastating nuclear attack. 
McDougal and Feliciano have stated, for example, that: 
[T]he standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in language so 
abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. 55 
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In their own extensive analysis of the required degree of necessity, McDougal 
and Feliciano are unable to provide tests that are less abstract, finally concluding 
that the requirement of necessity "can only be subjected to that most 
comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular 
context."56 Analyzing the particular context of the Cuban Missile Crisis of1962, 
Professor McDougal concluded that the US quarantine of Cuba was a lawful 
application of the doctrine of self-defense. 57 Central to his analysis was that the 
United States' action was an exercise of "initial discretion," which was then 
Qacked up by mustering the support of the members of the Organization of 
American States and reporting its action to the Security Council.58 
Sally and Thomas Mallison have analyzed the criteria for the lawful employ-
ment of self-defense against an imminent armed attack in several of their writ-
ings, mostrecendyin volume 64 of the Naval War College's "Blue Book" series 
(1991), where they, like McDougal and Feliciano, concluded that the Webster 
formulation was too restrictive, "since a credible threat may be imminent ,vith-
out being 'instant' and more than a 'moment for deliberation' is required to 
make a lawful choice of means."59 Like McDougal and Feliciano, they also as-
sert that whether an anticipatory resort to armed force in self-defense is lawful 
can only be determined in the context of the facts of the specific case.60 They 
emphasize that where anticipatory self-defense is claimed, the criteria for law-
fulness must be applied with greater stringency than when an actual attack has 
occurred.61 
Computer Network AHacks as IIArmed AHacks" 
It is important that what is under discussion here is not what may be lawful in 
an ongoing armed conflict (jus in bello) but rather actions by a hostile individual, 
group, or State against another State while the target State and the State of origin 
of the actions are not yet engaged in armed conflict (jus ad bellum). In an ongoing 
armed conflict (war), it is unquestionably legitimate for a State to attack its en-
emy's military telecommunications infrastructure, including military computer 
networks.62 Attacks on other telecommunications and network facilities which 
serve both military and civilian clientele may also be legitimate military objec-
tives, provided that the international humanitarian law of armed conflict is ob-
served with respect to proportionality, including limiting collateral damage.63 It 
is a matter ofindifference whether the mode of attack is kinetic or electronic, al-
though the former may be more objectionable since it is more destructive and 
may cause more long-lasting effects. 
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In examining whether a computer network "attack" may constitute an 
"armed attack," Article 51 cannot be construed in isolation but rather must be 
read in the context of other articles of the Charter, particularly Articles 2(4), 39, 
41 and 42. Article 2(4) provides: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political indepen"Ience of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of "any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to make 
recommendations or decide on "measures" to be employed under Article 41 or 
Article 42. Article 41 provides a non-exhaustive list of measures "not involving 
the use of armed force" which the Security Council may take including 
"complete or partial interruption of ... telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication." Article 42, in tum, provides for actions "by air, sea, or land 
forces" when the measures provided for in Article 41 are inadequate. Since the 
actions in Article 41 are described as "measures not involving the use of armed 
force, "64 whereas those in Article 42 involve the use of armed forces, it would 
appear that, at least as an initial presumption, a computer network attack would 
not be regarded as an "armed attack." Giving effect to such an initial 
presumption, however, ignores the significance of the drastic consequences that 
such an attack can have on the social, economic and military structure of a State. 
As will be discussed infra, whether an attack is to be considered as an armed attack 
depends on the consequences of the attack rather than the modality. 
The various terms used in the Charter, including the Preamble-"war" (pre-
amble), "armed force" (preamble), "acts of aggression" (Article 1), "threat or 
use offorce" (Article 2(4», "act of aggression (Article 39), and "armed attack" 
(Article 51 )-differ in scope and content. Though related in content "they differ 
considerably in their meaning."65 None of them is further explained in the 
Charter. 
This lack of definition has led to several attempts, primarily by the General 
Assembly, to give further content to the terms, particularly "act of aggression." 
Article 3 of the 1974 General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression" Resolution 
provides the following non-exhaustive list of acts which qualify as acts of 
aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
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invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use offorce of the territory of another 
State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the pprts or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State of the land, sea or air forces, marine and 
air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the tennination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.66 
While the term "act of aggression" is broader than "armed attack," it is appar-
ent that most of the acts listed in the General Assembly's resolution would also 
constitute an "armed attack" and would, if of sufficient scale and effect, invoke 
the victim's right to respond under its right of self-defense. 
As several recent articles and monographs have revealed, analyzing the novel 
and still-developing concept of computer network attack under either the cus-
tomary law of self-defense or Article 51 of the Charter presents both theoretical 
and practical difficulties.67 The principal difficulty flows from the fact that both 
traditionally and under the Charter, the discussion and codification of what con-
stitutes an act of aggression or an armed attack generally involve the use of 
armed force-either in the form of employment of military weapons or hos-
tile acts by members of the armed forces. It is now clear that the "armed 
force" involved does not have to be a part of the organized military forces of a 
State. As indicated above, the General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression" 
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Resolution, after listing certain acts involving the "anned forces of a State," also 
includes, as an act of aggression, the sending by or on behalf of a State of"anned 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of anned force 
against another State" or the substantial involvement of a State in such actions 
provided they reach a certain level of gravity.68 The judgment of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case likewise held that the "arming and 
training of the contras [by the United States] can certainly be said to involve the 
threat or use offorce against Nicaragua. "69 It also held, however, that the "mere 
supply of funds ... does not in itself amount to a use of force. "70 
Those publicists who have grappled with the problem of determining when a 
computer network attack constitutes an anned attack, have two possible ave-
nues of approach-either the instrumentality or the consequences test. Nearly 40 
years ago, Professor McDougal and Mr. Feliciano, though not visualizing cyber 
warfare, were critical of focusing on the instrumentality as the "precipitating 
event" for lawful self-defense, stating that to do so 
is in effect to suppose that in no possible context can applications of nonmilitary types 
of coercion (where anned force is kept to a background role) take on efficacy, 
intensity, and proportions comparable to those of an "anned attack" and thus present 
an analogous condition of necessity. Apart from the extreme difficulty of establishing 
realistic factual bases for that supposition, the conclusion places too great a strain upon 
the single secondary factor of modality-military violence.71 
Michael Schmitt points out, however, that: 
At least since the promulgation of the Charter, [the] use of force paradigm has 
been instrument-based; determination of whether or not the standard has been 
breached depends on the type of the coercive illstrnmellt-diplomatic, economic, 
or military-selected to attain the national objectives in question. The first two 
type ofinstruments might rise to the level ofintervention, but they do not engage 
the normatively more flagrant act of using force.72 
While admitting that an instrument-based approach provides a relatively 
easily-applied test for calculating lawfulness of an act of intervention,73 he 
ultimately concludes that it does not provide a useful test for computer 
network attack. 
Computer network attack challenges the prevailing paradigm, for its 
consequences cannot easily be placed in a particular area along the community 
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values threat continuum. The dilenuna lies in the fact that CNA spans the 
spectrum of consequentiality. Its effects freely range from mere inconvenience 
(e.g., shutting an academic network temporarily) to physical destruction (e.g., as 
in creating a hanunering phenomenon in oil pipelines so as to cause them to 
burst) to death (e.g., shutting down power to a hospital with no back-up 
generators). It can affect economic, social, mental, and physical well-being, 
either direcdy or indirecdy, and its potential scope grows almost daily, being 
capable of targeting everything from individual persons or objects to entire 
societies.74 
Professor Schmitt recognizes, however, the weakness of a system of analysis 
which attempts to apply a system developed to regulate kinetic activities to ac-
count for non-kinetically based harm.75 He calls for a new normative architec-
ture.76 Recognizing also, however, that there is no current consensus as to the 
need for developing such an architecture, he articulates an "appropriate norma-
tive framework"77 under current intemationallaw as framed within the UN 
Charter, that relies on the "consequences" theory. 
To constitute an anned attack, the CNA must be intended to direcdy cause 
physical damage to tangible objects or injury to human beings. . .. States, acting 
individually or collectively, may respond to a CNA amounting to anned attack 
with the use of force pursuant to Article 51 and the inherent right of 
self-defense.78 
The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense Univer-
sity has also adopted a "consequences" test as to whether a CNA rises to the level 
of an armed attack, stating: 
[I]t appears likely that an "anned attack" would include some level of actual or 
potential physical destruction, combined with some level of intrusion into its 
target's borders, or violation of its sovereign rights. . .. [A]ttacks that are 
sufficiendy destructive may qualify as "anned attacks," no matter what their level 
of intrusion, and vice versa.79 
Likewise, Professor Dinstein adopts a consequences test. He offers as examples of 
CNAs that would constitute armed attacks the following: 
Fatalities caused by loss of computer-controlled life-support systems; an extensive 
power grid outage (electricity blackout) creating considerable deleterious 
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repercussions; a shutdown of computers controlling waterworks and dams, 
generating thereby floods of inhabited areas; deadly crashes deliberately 
engineered (e.g., through misinformation fed into aircraft computers), etc. The 
most egregious case is the wanton instigation of a core-meltdown of a reactor in a 
nuclear plant, leading to the release of radioactive materials that can cause 
countless casualties if the neighboring areas are densely populated. In all these 
cases, the CNA would be deemed an armed attack.80 
Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., would lower the threshold substantially. 
[T]he mere penetration by a state into sensitive computer systems such as early 
warning or command and control systems, missile defense computer systems, and 
other computers that maintain the safety and reliability of a nuclear stockpile, 
should by their very nature be presumed a demonstration of hostile intent. 
Individually, these computer systems are so important to a state's ability to defend 
itself that espionage into anyone of them should be presumed to demonstrate 
hostile intent.81 
It is to be recalled that under the ]CS Standing Rules of Engagement, 
demonstration of a hostile intent is the determinant for permitting an armed 
response to an imminent armed attack.82 Invoking such a low threshold" for 
triggering the right to respond by armed force in self-defense seems to be 
establishing a dangerous standard, especially when it is often difficult to 
determine whether a computer network attack has occurred at all. In some 
instances, malfunctions which appear at first to be the result of computer 
network attack have been determined, after more thorough investigation, to be 
the result of faulty software or operator error. 83 
If one agrees that computer network attacks of some degree of severity and 
under some circumstances may constitute "armed attacks," then one must ap-
ply some criteria for determining when such attacks cross the threshold from 
interventions that do not warrant responses under the right of self-defense to 
those that do. As has been mentioned, the closest the UN Charter itself comes 
to describing anything remotely resembling CNA is in Article 41, where it 
lists "complete or partial interruption ... of telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication" as a measure "not involving the use of armed 
force" which the Security Council may take against threats to the peace, 
breaches of peace, or acts of aggression.84 Presumptively, computer networks 
would fall under a broad definition of "telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication," but in today's environment of almost total dependence on 
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the proper functioning of computer networks for control of vital societal 
functions, as well as critical national-security systems, the "complete or partial 
interruption" of such systems would have a much more drastic effect than 
anything that could have been envisaged by the framers of the Charter in 
1945. Article 41, therefore, cannot be said to require the categorization of 
computer network attacks as actions "not involving the use of armed force." 
As Professor Schmitt has suggested, it would be desirable for a normative 
architecture specifically tailored to CNA to emerge. For the present, how-
ever, until a consensus develops for the need for a new normative architec-
ture, it would appear that the most rational and practical test of whether a 
computer attack can be the precipitating event for the exercise of lawful 
self-defense is whether the consequences are major damage to or destruction 
of vital military or civilian infrastructures or the loss of human life. 
Anticipatory Self-Defense against Computer Network AHack 
As discussed earlier, there is substantial legal support for the proposition that 
where there is persuasive evidence that an armed attack is imminent, the po-
tential victim State is not required to stand idly by until the actual attack has 
occurred-it may respond with proportional force to ward off the attack. The 
difficulty with the application of this principle is in determining that in fact an at-
tack is imminent. In the case of an attack by kinetic means, there are usually (but 
certainly not always) intimations of an impending attack. Some may be ambigu-
ous, such as a step-up in propaganda or bellicose statements; others may carry a 
clearer threat-movement of troops to the border, mobilization of forces, 
increased aerial and electronic surveillance, deployment of naval and air forces, 
and clandestine in:filtration of intelligence agents. While a computer network at-
tack may also be preceded by acts that suggest an attack is imminent (or it may it-
self be a part of the pre-attack build-up for an attack by kinetic means), the 
capability of an attacker to cause almost instantaneous harm suggests that the first 
notice that a victim State may have that a computer network attack is underway 
is to experience the harmful effects themselves. If the consequence of the CNA 
is serious harm to vital infrastructure or loss of human life, then under the princi-
ples previously discussed, a proportional response is lawful. But difficult ques-
tions remain. Response against whom? Can the attacker be identified? The 
originator of the attack may have sent his electronic attack through multiple 
switches and servers in several different countries. Is the attacker acting on behalf 
of a foreign government, or is he merely a teen-age "hacker" engaged in what is 
to him a prank?85 If the hacker is not a direct agent of a foreign government, is 
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the foreign government aware of his actions and impliedly consenting to them? 
The permutations and combinations of situations under which attacks may oc-
cur number in the millions. Professor Schmitt has reported that today over 120 
countries are in the process of establishing information warfare competence86 
and by the year 2002 some "nineteen million individuals will have the 
know-how to launch cyber attacks."87 
Obviously, not every probing of a presumably secure network, whether 
one controlling vital civilian infrastructure or a military network controlling 
critical defense functions, such as air defense, atomic weapons, satellite com-
munications, or intelligence gathering, can be considered as a prelude to a 
full-scale network attack. Professor Schmitt has reported that the Defense 
Information Systems Agency identified 53 attacks on defense systems in 
1992.88 By 1995 the number had increased to 559 and was expected to reach 
14,000 in 1999.89 Figures supplied by the Defense Information Systems 
Agency reports are even more unsettling. That agency reported that the De-
fense Department may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks in 
1994.90 Although each of these "attacks" required investigation and appropri-
ate action, none of them presumably were of sufficient gravity either to indi-
cate that they were themselves an "armed attack" that would have authorized 
a resort to armed force in response nor were they regarded as indicators that 
such an armed attack was imminent. 
It would seem, then, that the most likely application of the doctrine of an-
ticipatory self-defense to computer network attacks would be in the case of 
such attacks that in and of themselves do not constitute an armed attack but 
rather are evaluated as precursors of an armed attack by kinetic means and/or 
further, more severe cyber attacks. In modem warfare, the electronic batde-
field will playa crucial role, and any steps that a prospective attacker can take to 
neutralize or destroy its enemy's electronic command and control, intelli-
gence, communications, or weapons-control networks prior to a kinetic attack 
would gain enormous advantage. While these preliminary CNAs may not 
themselves rise to the level of armed attack, they may, if combined with other 
evidence of an impending attack, be sufficient to authorize armed measures of 
self-defense-not against the CNAs themselves, but rather as an exercise of the 
right of anticipatory self-defense against the impending kinetic or more serious 
cyber attack. 
Professor Schmitt, who also visualizes the most likely scenario to be the use 
of CNA to soften up the batdespace,91 proposes a three-prong test for deter-
mining when a State may respond to a CNA that itself does not constitute an 
armed attack. 
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1. The CNA is part of an overall operation culminating in anned attack; 
2. The CNA is an irrevocable step in an imminent (near-tenn) and probably 
unavoidable attack; and 
3. The defender is reacting in advance of the attack itself during the last possible 
window of opportunity available to effectively counter the attack.92 
This formulation appears to be an application of Secretary Webster's dictum 
in the Caroline case, adapted to computer network attack. As we have seen, the 
Caroline standard has been found by many publicists to be too narrowly drawn to 
apply in all circumstances. "The last possible window" may be too late to avoid 
catastrophic results. The problem does not lend itself to a specific formula. I sug-
gest that whatever the formula used, in the final analysis, the decision maker 
must apply "that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reason-
ableness in particular context. "93 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have attempted to defend the proposition that a State's right 
to exercise its "inherent" right of self-defense by armed force is not limited to the 
situation in which an attack has actually occurred, but may also apply when a 
State has persuasive evidence that such an attack is imminent (anticipatory 
self-defense). The State exercising the right of anticipatory self-defense, however, 
bears a heavy burden of proof that the evidence upon which it acted was indeed 
persuasive and must withstand ex post facto examination by the international 
community, primarily through the Security Council. I have also attempted to 
demonstrate that the term "armed attack" may also include attacks upon com-
puter networks solely by electronic means if the consequences of such attacks in-
clude either substantial harm to vital civil or military networks, or loss of human 
life, or both. Although the first of these propositions is admittedly controversial, 
and some have labeled it a minority view, I believe that there is distinguished 
scholarly support for that position, as well as substantial support in State practice. 
The adoption of this position by the United States, as reflected in its military 
manuals and Standing Rules of Engagement is therefore justifiable. As to the 
second proposition, that is, that the test of whether an action constitutes an 
armed attack is the consequence of the attack, there does not seem to be any 
other choice, since an instrumentality-based criterion is wholly impractical in 
view of the capability of an innocuous instrument-the computer-to become 
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a lethal weapon in the hands of a skilled and persistent "hacker" determined to 
invade and attack another's computer network. 
When I attempt to apply the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to com-
puter network attack, I find myself in waters difficult to navigate. The most 
likely scenario for CNA is that it will occur suddenly, without warning. It also 
seems likely that a true hostile CNA reaching the level of an "armed attack" 
will not be an isolated incident, but rather will occur as part of the preliminary 
softening-up of the battlespace preceding an attack by kinetic weapons or a 
more serious cyber attack. Professor Schmitt apparently visualizes this same sce-
nario since he shifts the focus of his section on anticipatory self-defense to use of 
"computer network attack operations executed to prepare the battlespace."94 
Under these circumstances, it becomes even more important for a State facing 
what may appear to be an imminent CNA carefully to utilize all its resources in 
its analysis of all the surrounding events, political and military, to aid in its deter-
mination of whether an armed response may be made under the right of self-de-
fense. Only in this way can it meet its heavy burden of establishing the 
justification for initiating the first resort to the use of armed force. 
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